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ABSTRACT 
NetRAID is a framework for a simple, open, and free system to allow end-users to 
have the capacity to create a geographically distributed, secure, redundant system that will 
provide end-users with the capacity to back up important data. NetRAID is designed to be 
lightweight, cross-platform, low cost, extendable, and simple. 
As more important data becomes digitalized it is critical for even average home 
computer users to be able to ensure that their data is secure. Even for people with DVD 
burners that back up their data weekly, if the back ups and their sources are kept in the same 
physical location the value of the back-up is greatly diminished. NetRAID can offer a more 
comprehensive end-user back-up. 
NetRAID version 1 has some limitations with the types and speeds of networks it can 
run on; however, it provides a building block for the future extension to almost any sort of 
TCP/IP network. NetRAID also has the potential capability to use a wide variety of 
encryption and data verification schemes to make sure that data is secure in transmission and 
storage. The NetRAID virtual file system, sockets, and program core are written in Visual 
Basic.NET 2003, and should be portable to a . wide variety of operating systems and 
languages in the future. 
1 NETRAID BACKGROUND 
1.1 DESIGN GOAL 
The design goal for the NetRAID system is to create a framework for a simple, open, 
and free system to allow end-users to have the capacity to create a geographically distributed, 
secure, redundant system that will provide end-users with the capacity to back up important 
data. Unlike AFS [3], InterMezzo [20], Microsoft DFS, or other distributed file systems [25] 
NetRAID is designed to be lightweight, cross-platform, low cost (free), extendable, and 
relatively simple. Net~ID trades speed for the ability of wide distribution, and normal 
random access for reliability. NetRAID is not intended to compete directly with other 
distributed systems since it is a back-up medium only. 
1.1.1 WHY DISTRIBUTED BACK-UP? 
Even in well written and comprehensive books on disaster and data recovery like 
Cougias [12] and Toigo [45] there is a lack of material relevant to average computer users 
and small businesses. These books focus on how large organizations manage and leverage 
services provided by other large organizations such as EMC and IBM. They discuss ways to 
store petabytes of data in remote tape libraries and in other large buildings. These methods 
and hardware systems are not relevant or affordable to the vast majority of computer users on 
the internet even if they h<1:d the advanced training to operate such systems. 
As society becomes increasingly dependent on computers and their data files, the loss 
of critical information such as tax information, email, photos, and any other important 
documents can cause serious financial or emotional damage. For several years now large and 
even medium sized businesses and organizations have had the resources to maintain 
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complex, sometimes geographically diverse data back-ups for the preceding several years. 
However, easy back-ups of this type are still beyond the means of most of NetRAID's target 
end users. 
1.1.2 NETRAID's END-USERS 
Free market competition has helped to create an environment where writable CD and 
DVD drives are common in all new PCs, and inexpensive to acquire for existing systems. 
Their cheap, fast back-ups make it possible for end-users to back up files at little or no cost. 
If the back-ups and their sources are kept in the same physical location, however, the value of 
the back up is greatly diminished. NetRAID can help fill in this deficiency with a more 
comprehensive end-user back up. 
NetRAID ' s target user is a computer user at home or with a small business. These 
users maintain one or two computers and are probably primarily Windows or Mac OS X 
users. Common software packages include a word processor, email, spreadsheet, light-
weight database, basic accounting software, and some graphics software. The files they need 
to back up and secure are typically in the range of IKB to 15MB in size. They are connected 
to the internet via DSL, Cable, or possibly a Tl or higher LAN. NetRAID can, in theory, 
also work over modems. 
This profile has been further refined through an informal survey of selected users 
from among Iowa State University undergraduates and alumni. Those that had data for 
which NetRAID would be an appropriate back-up system had about 100-200MB of data in 
roughly 1-50MB chunks. Several of the respondents said they did not trust computers to 
preserve important information, and kept important data on paper only. If these respondents 
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were to encode their information with Portable Document Format (PDF) and archive it, the 
resulting electronic files would fall into the same range of data sizes as the respondents with 
files to back up. 
1.2 VISUAL BASIC.NET 2003 DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT 
When NetRAID was still in its planning stage, it became necessary to decide 
regarding what language to write it in. The goal was a cross-platform system. In the end this 
did not happen, but a port to UNIX (Mac OS X, Linux, BSD, and Sun's Solaris) operating 
systems should be fairly easy to accomplish. For cross platform ease, Java, C, C++ or now 
even Microsoft's C# (via Mono [26]) would have been more ideal languages to use. GCC, 
Java, and .NET all allow for relatively easy porting between several operating environments. 
Visual Basic.NET was in the end was selected for several reasons. VB.NET was the 
easiest to code given the skills of the programmer. The availability of a wide variety of 
sample code and excellent guide and documentation books, Microsoft Visual Basic.NET Step 
by Step by Halvorson [17], and Kurniawan and Neward's VB.NET Core Classes in a 
Nutshell: A Desktop Reference [22] were also major factors. Visual Basic and C# share 
much of the same syntax and the .NET runtime is language neutral. A future conversion 
from Visual Basic .NET to C# should be straight forward . Currently there are also several 
active efforts to extend Mono and other packages to support Visual Basic compatible 
languages, so conversion may not even be an issue. Also greater weight has been given to 
proving that NetRAID can work, than to developing optimized or even efficient code. 
One of Microsoft 's goals with .NET was to make computing more secure, and while 
their efforts on a broad scale are debatable, the newer cryptography and hash generation APls 
4 
are much easier to program with and have broader support than the older ones. A 
comparison of Bondi's Cryptography for Visual Basic: A Programmer's Guide to the 
Microsoft CryptioAPI [8] which is based on Visual Basic 6, with LaMacchia's .NET 
Framework Security [23], based on the .NET languages demonstrates with its examples the 
relative simplification of cryptography programming from the old to the new environment. 
1.3 TRADEMARK INFORMATION 
The term 'NetRAfD' resulted from several discussions with fellow students. The 
participants in these discussions were unaware that Hewlett Packard Corporation had been 
using the NetRAID trademark on a series of high end server SCSI RAID adapters during the 
1990s and into the early 2000s. After the initial NetRAID paper was written, "NetRAID" 
was Googled to see if the search engine had picked up on the paper. This led to the 
discovery of HP's product. NetRAID's website was modified to clarify the fact that HP 
apparently held the trademark on the term, but that the paper was not going to re-written 
unless HP requested it. 
Once NetRAID was decided on as a thesis project, HP's Intellectual Property 
Licensing Department was contacted via the HP website. A description of the project was 
submitted and a request was made to determine if a license could be acquired for the name, 
or if HP would protect its trademark. A week later HP replied that it was no longer using the 
term and it had no opposition to the term's use. The reply text is located in the appendices in 
section A2. 
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1.3.1 NET RAID LICENSING INFORMATION 
NetRAID will be released to the public under some sort of open source license. The 
exact license will be determined after the thesis defense. Open source development is still a 
bit like the Wild West in the software development world, but it is growing. Pavlicek' s book 
[32] is an excellent guide to the broader question raised by how to develop open source 
software. Open source development [27] using the .NET platform is growing, and NetRAID 
will be on the front end of that trend. 
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2 REVIEW OF PAST DISTRIBUTED FILE SYSTEMS AND BACK-UP 
METHODS 
2.1 DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 
Distributed systems date back to the early days of computer networks. The basic idea 
behind a distributed system is to spread the data or computations across many machines on 
e ither a local or wide area network. Most distributed systems tend to focus on distributed 
processing. Beowulf [38] and Seti@home [5] are two of the best current examples of low 
cost, distributed computing. Distributed systems can be used for data storage as well. With 
the emergence of the internet, the parts of a distributed file system can be located almost 
anywhere in the world. 
2.2 DISTRIBUTED COMPUTATION 
2.2.1 DATABASES 
One of the most common uses for distributed systems is databases. While distributed 
databases [21] are not quite the same as a true distributed file system, they are common, and 
share many of the same properties. As computer systems proliferated, it became easier for 
organizations to compile data for analyses (sales, personnel, payroll, etc) on a local server 
and they all have the local computer interact with a mainframe or cluster at a central data 
repository. The DataBase Management System (DBMS) has to maintain the integrity and 
transparency of data across the internet. The DBMS must also keep the data synchronized 
across the database nodes. XML has been revolutionizing distributed data bases over the last 
several years. 
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2.2.2 DISTRIBUTED OPERA TING SYSTEMS 
There are even a few distributed operating systems [37]. These use distributed file 
systems and often shared memory and CPU operations. Amoeba [ 4] was started in 1981 by 
Andrew Tannenbaum as a research project. It is a "pure" distributed system, where there is 
very little concept of a local machine. V-System is another distributed operating system 
made up of Sun and VAX systems. It is no longer being developed or in use, but a project 
us ing V developed the W windowing system. W was one of the main sources of influence 
and code for early versions of the modern X Windows system. Distributed operating systems 
are extremely complex systems, much more difficult to program and maintain than either 
distributed file systems or operating systems. 
2.3 DISTRIBUTED FILE SYSTEMS 
Levy and Silberschatz [25] wrote an excellent definition of a distributed file system. 
NetRAID fulfill s all of the requirements they specify: 
A DFS is a file system, whose clients, servers, and storage devices are 
dispersed among the machines of a distributed system. Accordingly, service 
activity has to be carried out across the network, and instead of a single 
centralized data repository there are multiple and independent storage devices. 
As will become evident, the concrete configuration and implementation of a 
DFS may vary. There are configurations where servers run on dedicated 
machines, as well as configurations where a machine can be both a server and 
a client. A DFS can be implemented as part of a distributed operating system 
or, a lternatively, by a software layer whose task is to manage the 
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communication between conventional operating systems and file systems. 
The distinctive features of a DFS are the multiplicity and autonomy of clients 
and servers in the system. 
2.4 SIMILAR SYSTEMS TO NETRAID 
William J. Bolosky and John R. Douceur and David Ely and Marvin Theimer's [7] 
2000 paper, Feasibility of a Sever-less Distributed File System Deployed on an Existing Set 
of Desktop PCs describes a system that has several similarities to NetRAID. It is 
decentralized, provides for redundancy, and uses encryption for privacy. The authors worked 
fo r Microsoft, and there is very little information on how they wrote the system, let alone the 
full source as NetRAID provides to the public. Their system took advantage of disk free 
space on Windows 98 and NT workstations. Their system was designed only for LAN use, 
and the ir paper never discussed what types of data they wanted their system to store. 
2.5 ANDREW FILE SYSTEM 
The Andrew File System is a distributed file system that Carnegie-Mellon University 
started developing in 1983. AFS is designed to work on a large scale. Deployments can 
involve thousands of computers. The file system is divided into two parts, the shared name 
space and the local name space. Each workstation has a local name space for it to hold 
programs and local settings. All systems are connected by LAN. The shared space is 
maintained by servers and uses a location-transparent file hierarchy. The physical location of 
data in the AFS system can change even while the information is in use. AFS allows any 
system user to access any file from any workstation. There are even provisions for providing 
transparent back-up by creating read-only copies of AFS cells. These are very useful in large 
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networks and for systems of computer labs. AFS is a scalable, mature, and robust file 
system. 
The Andrew File System is a very large, complex system, and requires integrated 
Kerberos authentication. AFS is designed for a much, much heaver load than NetRAID, and 
allows for random access. While these traits make AFS an excellent distributed file system, 
they also make AFS too difficult for an average computer user or administer to set up and 
maintain. NetRAID is designed to be simple and work well with small groups. 
2.6 OTHER DISTRIBUTED FILE SYSTEMS 
Frangipani [44] is a DFS for UNIX that uses a virtual disk system based on Petal to 
provide for a large single storage area to multiple users. Petal provides for lower level 
redundancy and file storage and the Frangipani server allows for many Petal servers to be 
tied together. Frangipani is designed for use on a trusted net cluster environment. 
Frangipani is designed to look like any other device in UNIX. xFS and Zebra [6] used RAID 
striping to provide a distributed file system that is similar to NetRAID in their use of RAID 
logic. Petal [24] provides similar services in abstracting the network logic from the storage 
logic to these distributed file systems as NetRAID' s virtual file system provides to NetRAID. 
These systems were designed with LANs and other high speed networks. NetRAID is 
targeted towards slower internet based WANs. 
2. 7 BACK-UP SYSTEMS 
The earliest use of distributed file systems was when researchers and system 
administrators would take their back-up tapes home with them and store them in their 
basement, or in other buildings on their campus. This approach has little in common with a 
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modern DFS. It was a very low tech and inflexible way to distribute data to protect against 
the failure of one geographical location. Cooper and Garcia-Molina [11] go into great detail 
about data replication and the best methods for distribution and replication. 
2.7.1 LARGE SYSTEM BACK-UPS 
Large computer networks face very complex back up problems. A modern corporate 
network may contain several terabytes of storage. Due to state and federal regulations suck 
as Sarbanes-Oxley many organizations have to keep detailed backups of data for many years 
in case of investigation or auditing. Stringfellow's book [40] about Sun based Network 
backups in good example. While the systems discussed are a few years old, the systems 
involved are similar. The best long term backup for large amounts of data is tape. One of 
the biggest problems with tape is the bandwidth needed to get the data across the network to 
the tape machine, and then the speed of writing the tape. For on line back-up, a solution such 
as SAN or large RAIDs is becoming more common. IBM and EMC make high quality 
storage systems that can store many dozens of terabytes. As clustering technology improves, 
these systems will continu~ to scale up to meet large companies with ample cash ' s needs. 
Storage Area Networks are a lso an excellent technology to implement large storage 
systems inside a corporate network. They can be implemented using a variety of hardware 
and protocols. SANs only work on local networks, and they require a large amount of 
network bandwidth. They can be very expensive to setup and require a knowledgeable staff 
to maintain. 
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2.7.2 HOME SYSTEM BACK-UPS 
Quality back ups for home users is the niche where NetRAID can make a difference. 
Tape drives have tended to be too expensive or complex for most home users. The best 
method for an average home user was to implement a RAID. Until recently this was 
expensive a slow. Hughes and Murray ' s [19] paper goes into detail about modern serial 
A TA drives and RAID. Home RAlDs are still relatively expensive, and do not offer off-site 
portability. Currently the best all around technology for home back-ups are CD and DVDs. 
Double layer DVDs hold over 8 GB and with compression they can hold significantly more 
actual data. These drives and media have come down considerably in price relative to 
storage size, and the software to run them has become easier to use and more functional. 
DVDs or CDs allow the user to send them in the mail to trusted individuals. They also allow 
for easy the creation of duplicates for further redundancy. 
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3 NETRAID Vl FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW 
3.1 NETRAID IS NOT RAID 
Patterson, Gibson, and Katz [31] m their "A Case for Redundant Arrays of 
Inexpensive Disks" explained how to use local disks to improve a computer's ability to store 
more data and keep it safe. NetRAID builds on RAID's reliability, but not its striping 
capability. NetRAID's real constraint is bandwidth. 
NetRAID nodes cammunicate over the internet, not a local bus, so the bandwidth can 
be very low. Even users with good DSL or cable connections can only rely on a few hundred 
kilobits per second. NetRAID users do not yet have the speed (1 - 3 Mb/s) that hard drives 
in the late 1980s had when Patterson, Gibson, and Katz wrote their paper. The internet also 
provides an unstable, best effort bus instead of the dedicated mainframe storage they were 
working with. Furthermore current drives based on ATA, SCSI, USB, or FireWire can 
transfer hundreds or even thousands of megabits per second. For higher efficiency NetRAID 
needs to minimize the amount of data transferred and have all transfers to be independent of 
each other. If the NetRAID cluster is implemented on a LAN instead of the internet, the 
higher bandwidth will allow for a much more rapid transfer of data. 
3.2 WHAT IS NETRAID? 
NetRAID is a peer-to-peer system. Each member of a cluster has two functions: 
client and server. NetRAID's client-side code is a collection of widgets and tools 
implemented with a GUI that allows each user to control their files and set their preferences. 
The NetRAID server is the code that runs NetRAID's network sockets and manages 
the communication between nodes. The server also controls access to the storage areas in the 
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cluster. The storage components are a virtual file system that stores the information. 
Because the system is modular these components are easier to maintain and improve. 
The virtual file system may or may not reside on the same computer as the node, but 
all network communications run though one point. The nodes are numbered, so if one is 
oftline, the other nodes can move on to the next box. This allows for the loss of a node 
without the long-term loss any of the data or functionality of the storage nodes. The only 
delay is the time needed for the clients to detect the absence of the primary node and revert to 
a secondary. Given the information duplication of N, the cluster can lose up to N-1 nodes 
without losing data. If the information is duplicated three times, two nodes can be lost and 
the information can still be regenerated . The original vision of NetRAID designated separate 
storage and server nodes, but as research and coding began, it became apparent that the 
original proposition that all nodes provide both server and storage would be fairly easy to 
implement. 
The storage functiOnality of the server in a NetRAID cluster does exactly what its 
name suggests: store data. Since, in theory, NetRAID works independently of the operating 
system, the details of the implementation of the storage on each client are left up to the 
specifics of that environment and file system. Currently NetRAID only exists in the .NET 
environment, so no variant has been developed. In the version one model, each node 
allocates a set amount of space on the local drive. A virtual file system, NRDFS (Net RaiD 
File System or "nerd-fs") is created and a local database is built. This allows for the 
reconstruction of a node based on information in each of the other nodes. The local file 
system knows what it contains, and how to retrieve it, but not necessarily how to read it. A 
determined local user might possibly access the local nrdfs node, but should be unable to 
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read individual files. Since each node is maintained by a user who is trusted to have access 
to the cluster's nrdfs, this problem is minimal. 
3.3 EXAMPLE USE OF NETRAID #1 
Consider a NetRAID cluster set up for Alice, Bob, Carol, Dave, and Eve (Figure 1). 
All systems are personal computers using Windows with .NET 1.1 runtime or higher. All 
users have administrator access to their own boxes and trust each other to store data, but do 
not want the others to read it. Each node is 1 GB, and no files larger than 20MB need to be 
backed up across the system. 
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FIGURE 1. A SAM PLE N ETRAID CLUSTER 
3.3.1 ADDING A FILE TO. THE CLUSTER 
A lice backs up her important files every day to CD and flash drive. She decides that 
she also needs to back up a term paper to the NetRAID cluster she created w ith her friends in 
order to make sure that she does not lose all of her work. The first vers ion of NetRAID does 
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not support uploading multiple files as part of a single job or the use of folders. Because of 
this, Alice will use an archiving program with support for such formats as ZIP, RAR, or TAR 
to place all data and their relative hierarchies into a single file. To help conserve space, she 
uses compression [18] [35]. Even though NetRAID uses AES encryption for transmission, 
she further secures her ipformation with her own favorite encryption method using the 
archiving program or stand-alone encryption software. 
Alice then opens her node control program and adds the file into the system. The 
local node records the file's vital information, generates a hash for later integrity verification 
and then breaks the file up into chunks. The computer selects three other nodes, and then 
transmits. The receiving nodes then compare hashes and place the file into their virtual file 
systems. A message is passed back to the source node verifying that all tasks have 
completed correctly. Since everyone in Alice's cluster is online and they all have high speed 
DSL, this takes only a couple of minutes to complete. Confident that her paper cannot be 
lost, Alice gets back to work. 
3.3.2 DELETING A FILE. 
Now that the file is in the system there are two options for Alice: she can delete it or 
retrieve it. Deletion is simple. Alice opens up her client software, finds her file in her client 
interface, and deletes it. The client knows where the copies of the files are being stored and 
tells the appropriate nodes to remove their copies by sending a file deletion message. Once 
this is done, the clusters will send back an OK message to Alice. 
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3.3.3 RETRIEVING FILES 
File retrieval is also is also relatively simple. First, Alice will open her file control 
menu and select the list of files she has stored in the system. Her node then selects a machine 
to retrieve the data from and then requests the file. After Alice's node has received an end-
of-file message it compares the information it has retrieved to the hash she generated when 
she stored the file. If they match, the retrieved file is then stored in her local file system in 
the NetRAID program folder. Alice can then decrypt and decompress her data using her own 
software. 
3.3.4 UPDATING A FILE 
Alice can update her file by uploading a new copy and then deleting the old one. This 
might be considered a waste of bandwidth, but it is simple and straight forward. 
3.3.5 REPAIRING THE SYSTEM 
Suppose that one night Alice's house suffers a small natural gas explosion that 
destroys her computer room. Her computers are destroyed, and all of her local back-ups melt 
in the resulting fire. The next day Alice buys a new computer and plugs it into her 
broadband connection. She calls up Bob who reads her the group information she needs to 
rewrite her configuration file using a simple text editor. This only takes a minute or two. 
She then opens NetRAJD, has it build the local virtual file system, and then clicks on 
" rebuild node." The regeneration happens in two phases. 
Just as when the cluster was initialized, the local client code creates the virtual disk 
and formats it. This takes a couple of minutes. Every cluster then generates a list of the files 
to be repaired that were on Alice ' s node and the location of other copies of the files. This list 
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gets parsed and her client code begins to download and rebuild her node. This makes sure 
that the data that everyone else had stored on Alice's computer is rebuilt in case a different 
node is somehow lost. The time this takes will depend on the internet connections that the 
cluster has at its disposal. Once the node is rebuilt, the cluster can begin to work normally 
again. 
Alice also now has access to all of the files that she stored in the cluster and can 
retrieve them as quickly as the network connections can move the data. She will have all of 
her documents, photographs, financial data, and the term paper she backed up the night 
before. 
3.4 EXAMPLE USE OF NETRAID #2 
A small company, ACME Corporation, has five retail locations in a region. There is 
one small central office at the first store with several workstations for use by the product 
designers and a secretary. All five locations have broadband internet connections. The 
owner bought an extra four older computers inexpensively at a .com liquidation sale. He 
bui It a NetRAID cluster out of them and placed his primary server at the original store. He 
runs a little script that backs up his most important data fi les to his cluster every night. 
One morning a nasty worm comes in through an email and infects all three computers 
in the main store office. -The ISP immediately detects the worm and quickly shuts off the 
connection. The server uses mirrored hard drives for back-up, but the consultant brought in 
to help fix the problem does not realize this and formats both disks. ACME's DVD back-ups 
are worthless because the burner broke two weeks ago and ACME' s staff was waiting for the 
manufacturer to send them the warranty mandated replacement. 
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ACME's owner looks up at his " Don't Panic" poster and realizes that while it hurt to 
lose everything on the office server, all he needed to do was boot up a PC, install NetRAID, 
type in the configuration file, and tell it to rebuild and retrieve his files. NetRAID' s 
distributed nature prevented the loss of the company' s most important data. 
3.5 EXAMPLE USE OF NETRAID #3 
NetRAJD doesn't necessary have to be used for wide-area distributed back-up. With 
a little modification it could be extended to act much like a current RAID system across 
several inexpensive, basic machines. A good example would be a small media company or 
organization that produces videos, music, or print ads and needs a large amount of short term 
back-up space for projects its employees are working on before the finished products are 
archived. 
This small media firm buys five beige-box machines, each with a one terabyte RAID 
5 setup. The firm has a tight budget so it has to compromise a bit on quality to get the 
desired size. Linux is installed and NetRAID is configured across the boxes. When a single 
disk goes bad the administer can then replace it and regenerate the local RAID. When a box 
dies, the administrator can regenerate the NetRAID cluster. By sacrificing NetRAID's wide 
area capability and then increasing its local bandwidth, the firm now has a large online back-
up cluster with only a small cash layout. 
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4 NETRAID IMPLEMENTATION 
NetRAID is made up of four primary components: the NetRAID file system, the 
network layer, the program core, and the user interface. These different threads are held 
together by the network layer and a shared message stack. The virtual file system is 
composed of four files: the virtual disk, the local FAT, the user FAT, and the index. Each 
has a specific job and structure. 
NetRAID is best implemented using groups of individuals that can trust each other to 
store data, but not necessarily to read it. NetRAID framework version 1, as described in this 
paper, uses a few assumptions to simplify its use. The first is that all nodes are using a fast 
network connection that is always on and reliable (i.e., not a modem). The second is that the 
machines are always on. Furthermore, the NetRAID framework should be flexible enough to 
allow for the users to plug in many different types of clients, encryption, and network 
interfaces. As security theory and practice evotv·es, the ability to adapt quickly will make 
NetRAID much more useful. 
While NetRAID's redundancy level can be set by its users, the default level in 
version one is a five node cluster with three copies of the file in the system. If N equals the 
number of copies of information in the system, NetRAID can lose N-1 nodes without losing 
any information. In version one, two nodes can be lost and then rebuilt without losing any 
information in the system. Just as with classic RATDs, redundancy comes with a loss of 
speed and space. 
20 
4.1 NETRAID VIRTUAL FILE SYSTEM (NRDFS) 
The virtual file system, nrdfs, is meant to be very simple and is designed for speed 
and security. The initial drive is allocated by the client software. How this is implemented 
depends on the local operating system. All nrdfs requires is a file ID, source node, file size, 
date and time, and what blocks the file uses. This allows the system to retrieve and send files 
around the system, even though local user lacks the ability to read them. The local user's 
nrdfs also maintains a directory structure of the local user's files. The table needs file ID, file 
name, node 1, node2, node3, size, and hash information. 
The first version of nrdfs is based on a simple FAT type of file system. This system 
is very simple and can be inefficient, but it does meet the essential requirements of an early 
implementation. During testing the reading and writing from the data store was very quick 
on the 500MHz laptop that most ofNetRAID was written on. The primary data bottleneck in 
NetRAID is the network bandwidth, not the local system 1/0 capability. The Visual Basic 
.NET code for implementing and running nrdfs one is relatively simple and should be easy to 
maintain and optimize. Since NetRAID is designed to be modular, it should be easy to swap 
in a different nrdfs system. that conforms to the same APis and be transparent to the network 
layer. Different implementations of NetRAID should even be able to use different node file 
systems, as long as the network layer remains compatible. 
4.1.1 WHY A VIRTUAL FILE SYSTEM? 
NetRAID is designed to be a simple, lightweight, robust, open, and cross platform 
system. Implementing a virtual file system helps to accomplish all of those goals. .NET, 
GTK+ [46], Sun's Java, and other toolkits allow for more portable code. By not using OS 
21 
specific calls to the local data repository that are file system specific, NetRAID remains more 
portable. By using .NET'-s file classes, NetRAID is able to run on any platform that .NET 
supports with no platform specific changes. In some environments NetRAID might itself be 
on a RAID or a network share. During testing it was even implemented on removable Jazz 
disk. The Virtual File System also allows the host operating system to manage and optimize 
its placement on the native file system. The primary references for writing Nrdfs was 
Tanenbaum's chapter [42] on file systems, Grosshans' File Systems [16] and Dennis M. 
Ritchie and Ken Thompson [34]. 
Just as with other parts of NetRAID, there is no need to implement extra complexity 
1n NetRAID if low level functionally can be offloaded to the expert programmers at 
Microsoft, Sun, or an open group. They have worked hard to write their software, so there is 
no reason for NetRAID to reinvent the wheel. This reliance on a specific toolkit also has a 
software life cycle justification. The developers of these tool kits are supposed to maintain 
and improve their code. During the initial NetRAID development the environment was 
changed from .NET 1.0sp2 to l.lspl. Since the code was written using standard .NET 
functions and APis, NetRAID was able to benefit from Microsoft ' s work on performance and 
security without modifying a single line of NetRAID code. Relying on such a specific, 
widely used and well maintained development framework should improve portability and 
development. There is no reason that the NetRAID framework cannot be implemented with 
different toolkits on different environments. 
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4.1.2 NRDFS VIRTUAL DISK 
The virtual disk is programmed as a very simple binary stream object in .NET. The 
.NET framework runtime does most of the work. The node is created by writing binary Os to 
a file that is of size CLUSTER_SIZE * CLUSTERS. These constants are determined by the 
user ' s configuration settings. The size can be manipulated by changing a constant in the 
code, or eventually a number in the configuration file . There are no complex structures. To 
find a location in the file, the binary reader or writer is directed to go to the CLUSTER_ SIZE 
* ClusterID and then read or write CLUSTER SIZE amount of data. The data is then read 
into or written from a binary array, and those are dumped into a stack for movement around 
the program. 
4.1.3 DIRECTORY SUPPORT 
The first version of the NetRAID framework does not support a hierarchal folder 
system. This would add extra complexity to the system and is not needed at this time. End 
users should really use a compression/archiving program to wrap up their folders and make 
them as small as possible. A good example of this is backing up NetRAID ' s source folders . 
When it is archived, it is a lot smaller, and just one file as opposed to lots of text and binary 
files in quite a few folders. Most archiving software support some sort of encryption to 
provide extra security, or a single file can easily be encrypted by a wide variety of tools, free 
or not, that can encrypt files. 
Why not just put them in a specific folder? For the first version, this would seem be a 
faster and simpler plan. However, there are reasons to implement a virtual disk this early in 
development. 
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The virtual disk helps to hide the data from the local node ' s owner. One of the core 
premises of NetRAID is that Alice can trust Bob to store her data, but not to read it. If Bob 
can look in a NetRAID\Stored folder and see files , it is very tempting for him to open them 
up. If he has to write his own binary reader and Local FAT information parser before he can 
get to the data, it will slow him down. Allocating all of the drive space at once should reduce 
host fi le system fragmentation. VMWare also has an option to either dynamically allocate 
space fo r virtual disks, or allocation all at once. 
4.1.4 LOCAL FAT TABLE 
The local virtual file allocation table (Figure 2) is implemented in VB.NET as a 
structure. It is fairly simple, but does hold more data than a typical FAT on a disk such as the 
SHA5 l 2 [33] hash value. The data is all either strings or integers and can be read or written 
very eas ily using a binary stream object. 
Public Structure LocalFAT 
'//Tbe f:i' :i..J .. e ID 
Public Fi l eID As I nt16 
r//1'hs first Cluster allocated 
Public FirstCluster As Int32 
1 //whc:.:i ' !:l fi.:L.~_'._) it i!:l 
Public Source As Byte 
Public FileSize As Int32 
Public FileNarne As String 
Public DateAndTirne As String 
Public Hash As String 
End Structure 
Figure 2. Local Virtual File Allocation Table Code 
• The File ID is based on the combination of the source ID and a random number to 
mitigate the problem of conflicting file numbers in the system. First, NetRAID 
generates a random number, and then multiplies it by 1000. To attach the source, it 
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then multiplies the number by ten and adds the source number. ln version one the 
file ID is 16 bytes. This limits NetRAID to only hold about 64,000 files. This might 
seem like a cap on the system, but it shouldn't be. NetRAID is not designed it back 
up thousands of little files, it is designed to work with a few hundred larger files. 
The FilelD could be expanded to 32 bytes at a future date with out too much trouble 
if it is needed. The current limiting factor is the regeneration code, version one can 
only regenerate about 300 files. 
• The FileName is the name of the file input into NetRAID. 
• The FileSize is the integer size of the file in bytes. This is needed to truncate the 
extra junk at the end of the cluster of the last segment of the file. The first cluster is 
the cluster where the file starts. When the file is being read back from the virtual file 
system there is a function that will make figure out the next cluster given the first 
cluster until the end of the file is reached. If the file allocation system is looked at as 
a database, this is where the FAT table is linked to the Index table. 
• The hash is the SHA512 hash of the file to verify integrity. 
• Source identifies the file origin. 
• DateAndTime is the timestamp of when the file was added into the NetRAID system. 
• T he file name is recorded just incase the original source node needs to be rebuilt 
4.1.5 Us1mFAT TABLE 
The User table (Figure 3) is very similar to the local FAT table. The difference is the 
lack of a start cluster since the UserFAT does not address disk space, but instead the network 
locations. The hosts are the three network locations of the file. These are implemented as 
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data type byte since a byte takes up the least amount of room in memory. NetRAID is not 
designed to have more than the 256 computers that the data type supports. 
Public Structure Use r FAT 
Public Fi leID As Int16 
Publ i c Fi leName As St r ing 
'//si.ze in bytes 
Public FileSize As Int32 
~//'.:·;H/\? Ha::-;h 
Public Hash As String 
Public DateandT imEiJ As String 
Public Hos tl As Byte 
Public Host2 As Byte 
Public Host3 As Byte 
End Structure 
FIG URE 3. USER VIRTUAL FILE ALLOCATION TABLE CODE 
4.1.6 FILE INDEX 
The File Index (Figure 4) is very simple. It gives the cluster number, if it is in use, 
and if it is in use then the address to the next cluster. If there is no next cluster, there is a 0 
value. 
Source Job Number 
I 1 I 1 I a I a I Payload 
Message Type Message Number 
Figure 4. A NetRAID Message, Sizes in Bytes 
4.1.7 POTENTIAL PROBLEMS 
A potential problem in the current virtual file system is the possibility of data 
corruption in the various files . The fix for a corrupted file is to delete it and regenerate the 
node. As the NetRATD software improves, the efficiency and speed of the virtual file system 
should improve. 
26 
4.2 NETWORK TRANSMISSION 
For communication over a network or the internet, NetRAID uses a standard message 
and directly calls .NET' s TCP socket APis for communication. Version one uses TCP socket 
1978; however, users can set the socket number in the configuration file. Socket 1978 is 
registered to UniSQL; however, Google could not even find a home page for UniSQL so it 
should be satisfactory for most home users. Allowing each cluster to set its socket number 
may slightly improve security since an eavesdropper would have to know the exactly which 
socket to listen on. 
4.2.1 SOCKET LISTENER 
As soon as NetRAID is launched it creates a thread to listen for incoming messages. 
Vi sual Basic sockets and socket manipulation is very similar to standard UNIX CIC++ code. 
The code is similar to the examples provided by Stevens [39] , but with some Visual Basic 
specific key words instead·of C. When the messages are received they are decrypted and each 
pushed into a stack for the program core to analyze. 
4.2.2 SOCKET SENDER 
When NetRAID needs to send information a sender object is declared that contains 
the ab ility to open the socket for writing. This is done most often by the core thread ; 
however, the primary thread does send a few messages. The encryption function is called by 
the sender object directly. 
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4.2.3 NET RAID MESSAGE STRUCTURE 
The structure of a NetRAID message (Figure 4) and code (Figure 5) is fairly simple. 
They contain Source, Type, Job Number, Message Number, and then Payload. The structure 
of the Payload is based on the message type . 
Public Structure Net RAI DMess ag e 
Dim Source As Byte 
Dim MessageType As Byte 
Dim JobNumb e r As I nt64 
Dim Mes s ageNumber As I nt64 
Dim Payload( ) As Byte 
Dim Ra wData() As Byte 
End Structure 
Figure 5. NetRAID Message Data Structure 
NetRAID contains several functions and utilities that can either generate or parse the 
RawData to and from the other variables. The Payload size is set by a constant in the 
software, and in future versions it will be possible for it to be set from the configuration file. 
In version one the payload is two thousand bytes. The RawData array is set from a constant 
that is derived from the payload size plus the size of the header. This constant then also sets 
the network buffer size. 
4.2.4 JOB NUMBER GENERATION 
Each unique task that is executed by NetRAID is assigned a unique ID. By having a 
unique number each node .can juggle several tasks. The number is generated by multiplying 
a random number by ten million, and then that is multiplied by the current millisecond. To 
associate the job number to a specific origin node, the number is then multiplied by ten and 
the node is added, so that the last digit is always the node . During testing it was found that 
job numbers conflicted roughly 1.5 times per ten thousand attempts. Since NetRAID is 
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likely to have only a few dozen transactions per day and each node's numbers will always be 
different than the numbers from the other nodes, the chances of a collision should be remote. 
Since the milliseconds are a seed, over the course of a day this element will keep changing. 
At the moment there is no security function assigned to job numbers; however, this could 
change in the future. The number generation algorithm could be improved so that a collision 
would be even more unlikely; for now however, this method seems to be adequate. 
4.2.5 MESSAGE NUMBER GENERATION 
The message numbering is done sequentially to ensure that messages can be 
reassembled in order. Just as with the job number, this message numbering has no current 
security feature, but that could change in future versions ofNetRAID. 
4.2.6 MESSAGE TYPES 
The message type tells the NetRAID core how to handle the data (Figure 6). As 
NetRAlD grows, more types can be added. Since the information is being carried as a byte, 
up to 255 commands can be held before the message structure will have to be revisited. At 
the current time only 22 (9. 7%) of the commands are used, so there is plenty of growth 
potential in the name space. 
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Number Description 
3 Testing Ping 
10 Get node free space 
11 Amount of free space 
20 Delete a File 
21 Deletion Confirmation 
30 File Data 
31 End of File and file information 
32 File received OK 
40 Request a file, file information 
41 File Data 
42 End of File 
50 Begin Regeneration 
51 File list token message 
52 Files to Send list 
53 Rebuild node file payload 
54 End of file and file info 
55 End of node regeneration 
60 Begin User FAT rebuild 
61 User FAT payload data 
62 User FAT end of data 
63 User FAT rebuilt correctly 
70 Text message 
Figure 6. Listing ofNetRAID Message Types 
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4.2.7 DETERMINING DESTINATION NODES 
NetRAID, version one, uses random number generators to determine the three 
destination nodes. Ideally, the nodes would make a rough determination about what nodes 
have free space and better·network connections. This is why there is support for determining 
free space; however, this algorithm has not been implemented. 
4.3 NETRAID CORE 
Most of NetRAID's work is done by a thread launched immediately after the listener 
is launched . This program core checks to see ifthere are any incoming messages to analyze. 
[f there are not, it sleeps for a fraction of a second before checking again. If information is 
present in the 1 istening queue, the main function passes it off to a sub-routine that parses the 
message and cal Is whatever functions it needs on the basis of the message type. If the code 
calls for the data to be held until a different type of message comes in, the core has its own 
internal stack for temporary storage. For example, if the node starts getting in type 30 
messages, it stores them in the internal stack and then checks the next message. It does this 
unti I it gets a type 31, then in sorts though the message stack and picks up on any data with 
the same job number. These messages are removed from the stack and the file is processed. 
There is probably a better way to write the system than a large case statement that 
calls subroutines as needed; however, at the moment this method works accurately and seems 
to be stable. The more threads that are introduced, the more complex the memory 
management will be. 
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4.4 NETRAID USER INTERFACE 
The NetRAID GUI is very simple. There is a main form (Figure 7), a local node 
control (Figure 8), and a network interface GUI (Figure 9) . The main form launches the 
li stener and core threads and is the launching point for the other two forms. The GUls are 
primitive and spartan, but they allow a user to . manipulate the NetRAID cluster' s basic 
functionality. 
[ile fl.bout 
Files Cc•ntrol 
NetRAID vl.2-2 .NET Ckent 
Figure 7. NetRAID Main Form 
ReQen~.Y.e 
Node 
Fomu1t 
Setup Group 
Pa~'YllOJd 
- lt:l l.29 
Message 
Figure 8. NetRAID Local Control Form 
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Figure 9. NetRAID Cluster Interface Form 
4.5 OTHER IMPLEMENTATION INFORMATION 
4.5.1 THREADING 
True threading only became supported in Visual Basic recently, so there are not many 
good samples and tutorials in wide circulation. Ardestani et al.'s book [2] is an excellent 
resource on Visual Basic, expanding on specific resource to expand on Tanenbaum's [43] 
more general Minux examples. 
There are potential problems with synchronization and other multi-thread related 
programs. As NetRAID matures, these problems will be resolved more thoroughly than they 
have been in the first version. In Version One, the only cross thread variable is the stack that 
the listener places received data in to by analyzed by the program core. Another potential 
problem is a conflict that occurs when two threads try to access the same files in NRDFS. 
During testing this has not been a problem, but more work needs to be done to make sure 
Version One is truly thread safe. 
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4.5.2 THE CONFIGURATION FILE 
NetRAID uses an XML-like configuration file to set many of its variables. By 
providing an easy-to-edit text file to a user, NetRAID gains quite a bit of flexibility. 
Furthermore, debugging a simple text file is much easier than constantly having to change 
hard-coded variables during testing. For example, the line to set the local nrdfs directory is 
<DlR>C:\NETRAID</DIR>. Each line in the file is parsed by a module that runs at the 
program startup. The module knows many of the defaults and performs error checking on 
the data elements. The lines do not have to be in any specific order, and comments can begin 
with a "#" character. 
4.5.3 TEXT MESSAGES 
The ability to send text messages from one node to another was developed initially as 
a debugging tool. Instead of sending files across an entire cluster for testing, the developer 
could send a simple text message from the source node to a designated destination node. 
This allowed for the testing of the encryption and network communications without having to 
wait for the complex code and protocols involving nrdfs and the constant formatting of all 
the nodes between each test. This functionality was exposed to the end user with version 1.1. 
This is not a replacement for a system such as AOL's Instant Messenger, but it does allow for 
secure direct text messaging from one node to another. For members of the same cluster, this 
a llows for communication without worries of being snooped on or monitored. 
The Text Message System uses two dialog boxes, one for an initial message (Figure 
I 0) and one for replies. In the future this could be accomplished with one more complex 
fo rm . 
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Message 
To: 
Send 
Figure 10. NetRAID New Text Message Dialog 
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5 NETRAID SECURITY 
NetRAID is designed to provide a satisfactory level of security that is consistent with 
convenience and reasonably quick performance. As the program is further developed, more 
security elements and techniques can be integrated into the framework. However, the cluster 
users should be able to decide what level of security they need. The more encryption used, 
the slower the system is. Each group needs to find a balance between speed and simplicity 
and security beyond a certain baseline. The best security is usually the most transparent (for 
both CPU and user interaction), and all efforts need to be made to build the system correctly 
in the first place. By planning every aspect of the client and the framework with security in 
mind, and then making everything as modular as possible, NetRAID should be safe and 
accurate. 
5.1 FILE SECURITY 
All systems have security problems, and NetRAID is probably no different. 
However, the NetRAID framework is built upon .NET with its support for widely used and 
well understood protocols and systems. Many of the security components are semi-
independent of NetRAID, and as problems arise they can be patched with minimal 
disruptions to the functioning of the cluster. TCP/IP, SSH, WebDAV [48], SSL all have had 
security flaws either inherent in them or in their implementation; however, they should 
provide NetRAID with adequate encryption and security for transmission across the public 
internet. As new flaws and fixes are discovered, a modular NetRAID and be fixed and 
updated just like larger projects such as the Firefox [14] browser or the family of Apache 
[13] web server projects. 
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5.1.1 USER RESPONSIBILITIES 
Each user is responsible for his or her own file encryption. While NetRArD uses 
AES encryption for transmission, the more encryption the longer it takes an attacker to break 
the file. 
5.1.2 GROUP PASSWORD 
NetRAID has support for a group password. This needs to be the same for all nodes. 
This is created by the input a string of text. An SHA512 hash is generated from the key, and 
then a second hash is generated from the hash and stored. This second hash is used to verify 
that the original password is correct. By using the hash of the text a long string of pseudo-
random information is used. A dictionary attack on the group password would require the 
attacker to first generate the SHA hash of the original string and then comparing the hash of 
that to the stored file. The extra computations involved will slow down the attack. The 
group key can be used as a source of the encryption key or for digital signatures. 
5.1.3 PERSONAL PASSWORD 
Ideally the user when starting NetRAID should input a password. This functionality 
has not been implemented yet. This would facilitate better key generation and individual 
authentication. 
5.2 TRANSMISSION SECURITY 
NetRAID is just like any other system that sends information over the internet. ls the 
data going to be secure, are the senders who they claim to be, and is the data integrity intact? 
Version One has support for AES [29] using the Rijndael [28] algorithm. The key is 
generated from the first p~rt of the SHA512 Hash. The initialization vector is based on the 
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destination address of the node. If Node 1 is sending to Node 4, then the IV is a derivative 
of "4". The IV does not need to be transmitted since the source and destination both know it. 
An attacker would need to know the Node number of the destination to create the IV. Even 
is the key is compromised each computer still needs a unique IV. An attacker would have to 
use all of the possible IVs, this wouldn't take long, but would slow someone down. 
The password may come from three sources. The worst method is a hard coded 
default key embedded in the code. This is very nice for debugging, but should be removed 
from future versions so end users aren't tempted to use it. The second is a text file in the 
\NetRAID folder that stores data. A hash is created based on the contents of this file and the 
key generated from the hash. This is better since a group can set the password to be what 
ever they 'd like. However, if the text file can be read, the encryption is then useless. The 
best method is a password that is input and a hash generated from that. It is then checked 
against a hash of the hash derived from the key. The key is then not stored in either the code 
or on the disk, only the hash of the hash of the key. It would take quite a bit of CPU power 
to reverse the SHA512 hash on the disk. There are better ways to attack a PC than reversing 
SHA512 hashes. 
5.2.1 USE OF ASYMMETRIC KEYS 
One potential source of encryption for NetRAID is the use of short term or one time 
asymmetric keys. The .NET cryptography has support for several types of encryption 
systems. RSA would be an easy and well researched system to use. Key pairs can be 
generated using random and pseudorandom information and distributed to the cluster. Each 
node can keep a key ring for the rest of the cluster. This would require more CPU power, 
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and a few more kilobytes of traffic, but these costs would be worth the extra security. A key 
ring would need to be implemented to support this encryption structure. 
5.2.2 USE OF SYMMETRIC KEYS 
Alternatively or in conjunction with asymmetric keys, NetRAID could also use 
several different types of symmetric keys. .NET supports both Triple DES, and AES. 
NetRAID Version One already has AES encryption for transmission. With symmetric keys 
there is a problem of distribution and management. Keys could be exchanged via external 
communication or asymmetric distribution. 
With the first method of exchange the initial passwords could be set via a phone call 
or encrypted email or other communication between the users setting it up. If the client 
software is encoded with good password generation rules, then weak passwords and key 
problems should be resolved before they can happen. Voice phone lines can be bugged, but 
there should be a reasonable expectation of the privacy of voice phone lines. For the first 
version of NetRAID, there is transmission security; however, the key is not random and 
constantly changing. If the users encrypt their files before adding them to the cluster than 
even if someone sat and intercepted all messages, this person would still need to work 
through the individual file encryption put in place by the users. 
The other method by which symmetric keys might be exchanged requires the use of 
asymmetric keys for key distribution. This method would bypass potential person-to-person 
problems since the nodes would be communicating directly. However, this method would 
require even more CPU power for key generation. The NetRAID code would have to allow 
for a second key ring to support both sets of keys. This should not be too difficult and would 
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be worth while in terms of improved security. This is similar to a Java based system 
described by Parnerkar, Guster, and Herath [30]. 
5.2.3 USE OF ONE TIME KEY SYSTEMS 
NetRAID should be a flexible system that can conform to the security needs of each 
specific cluster. The most security conscious user could implement a system of one time 
asymmetric and symmetric keys. With each new job the origin computer would generate a 
new key pair based on a hash created from several types of data including a random number 
and the time. This key would then allow for the distribution of a symmetric key based on 
similar, non-predictable information. After each job is completed, each node would toss out 
all key information. This would require a significant increase in CPU power, and a few 
kilobytes of extra data per job, but if the cluster only handles a few jobs each day, there is no 
reason that a user would find this security measure affecting the performance of any modern 
computer significantly. If the user group values the security of its data that much, then it 
shou Id be able to protect this data with as many layers of encryption as it seems necessary. 
5.2.4 MAN IN THE MIDDLE ATTACKS 
A man in the middle problem can arise. Since messages are sent out on the public 
internet they could be grabbed and cracked. One method of preventing data corruption is the 
storage of the initial SHA512 hash on the origin server. Each client would check against it to 
help mitigate man-in-the-middle corruption. If there is someone with enough skill and CPU 
power to crack and spoof hashes attacking a cluster, then corrupted data is probably going to 
be the least of the user' s data security problems. Digital signatures could be introduced into 
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the system, but that is yet another layer of complexity that would have to be added and 
maintained. 
5.2.5 AUTHENTICATION 
NetRAID currently has no authentication. A first step in fixing this problem would 
be to have the listener verify the sending address. Addresses can be spoofed, but verification 
would make a potential malicious user have to go through a bit of extra work to set up the 
spoof. A better method. would be to enforce some sort of signature or authentication 
message. NetRAID has support for the generation of a group password that could help 
authenticate machines. If someone tried to spoof being a node, they would also need to know 
the group password or their data would be gibberish and ignored by the system. 
5.3 HASHES 
NetRAID uses .NET' s SHA5 l 2 hash generation APl to create hashes of files for 
integrity verification. SHA512 was chosen because it was the strongest hashing algorithm 
that .NET 1.1 supported. 
41 
6 SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
6.1 NETWORK LOAD . 
NetRAID's impact on a network and on a workstation should be minimal. The 
example network in figure one has five nodes. If each node backs up five files of five 
megabytes each per day, that is 25MB per node. Since each file goes to three machines that 
is 75 MB upload per day. With a 256kb/s upload rate, that is about 39 minutes of upload 
time per day. The extra overhead is only a few kilobytes per day. Each node would also be 
downloading (upload in MB I(# of machines - 1) * 3 *#of machines) or about 281 MB per 
day. With a 2mb/s DSL/Cable connection, the total download time is under 10 minutes 
depending on network speed. The addition of queuing and better network load balancing to 
NetRAID could dramatically decrease the bandwidth needed. Built in scheduling support 
could allow transfers to run at times when the internet has more available bandwidth. The 
implantation of a fast compression scheme like gzip [49] could also significantly improve 
bandwidth. However, if the files that are being sent have already had ZIP, RAR, or GZIP 
used on them, then the built in GZIP module would be redundant and only serve to waste 
CPU power. 
6.1.1 NETWORK ASSUMPTIONS FOR VERSION ONE 
The first version ofNetRAlD works on any network connection that can have a static 
IP. Firewalls might be a problem, but ifthe designated port is open, it should work. NATs 
should a lso work as long as the addresses and ports are forwarded correctly. Version 1.x 
development occurred on a small LAN running at I OOMb behind a NAT home router and 
firewall . 
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6.2 MODEM CONNECTIONS 
Regular V.90 dial-up modems present an interesting challenge to the NetRAID 
infrastructure. They are slow and unreliable. Backing up a 25MB file on a DSL connection 
should only take a couple of minutes. However, on a 56Kbs modem it might take ten times 
longer. Given the importance of keeping accurate data, few people would find this slower 
speed worth it. 
There are also a variety of techniques such as Microsoft BITS [l] to try to only use 
background bandwidth in a connection to make the data load more transparent. If several 
programs are using that same background bandwidth then the system becomes slow anyway. 
There should be a way to set up a 'proxy' node on one of the high-speed connections that 
would act as a proxy for the modem-based node and then synchronized with it whenever the 
modem connection is on. This method could be applied to satellite phone equipped laptops 
or other low bandwidth connections. The storage node could even be de-coupled from the 
server half of the application. Given the declining use of modem connections, this problem 
should be resolved with newer technologies. By keeping the NetRAID code open source, if a 
modem user wanted to extend the framework or client to better accommodate lower speed 
connections, then they could. 
6.3 ENCRYPTION LOAD 
The first version of NetRAID use AES for transmission security using [15] as the 
primary guide. Users should also encrypt the files that they post using any tool that they 
chose based on their own preferences. During testing, there was no noticeable difference in 
speed with encryption on or off. 
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The CPU load of encrypting and decrypting files could drag on node performance as 
much as the network's load. In a test using a 140bit AES key on an AMO XP l.5GHz CPU, 
it took less than a minute to encrypt a 5MB file. As personal computers continue to increase 
in speed, problems of this type will become even less noticeable. For an average user 
NetRAID will only use a few CPU minutes per day spread across the day. The CPU and 
network cost is worth the return of having secure, distributed back-ups. 
6.4 HOST SYSTEM RESOURCES 
6.4.1 INSTALLER 
The installer package is about 3.5 megabytes and is in the Microsoft System Installer 
format. It is built using Visual Studio 2003. If the user does not have the .NET runtime, he 
or she needs to download and install it from Microsoft. 
6.4.2 MEMORY FOOTPRINT 
When the program is at idle, NetRAID 1.0 uses roughly 18MB of memory. When 
NetRAID is processing a.job this can dramatically increase based on the file size and the 
operations that need to be performed. This memory requirement is in add ition to any 
resources the .NET runtime is using. 
6.4.3 NRDFS FOOTPRINT 
fn the default 25,000 cluster mode, the disk footprint for Nrdfs is about 50 megabytes. 
In real world use this would need to expand. The number of clusters is a constant that can be 
manipulated by the configuration file. 
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6.5 NETRAID AS DISTRIBUTED FILE SYSTEM 
6.5.1 NAMING AND TRANSPARENCY 
A file name is really just a logical pointer to a block of data. According to Levy, this 
should remain transparent. There should be no need to have a different file name or to 
change file names based on the physical location of the file. The system user cannot tell the 
location of the file from the name or ID. In NetRAID the file ID is generated once, and the 
locations of the file remain completely transparent to the human user of the system. The user 
will click on a file name to back up, retrieve, or delete, and NetRAID uses the information it 
has stored in the system to do its task. 
6.5.2 CACHING 
NetRAID does not need to implement caching for fast access. Since NetRAID is not 
designed for random access, but as a back-up system, caching is not necessary. 
6.5.3 REMOTE ACCESS 
NetRAID provides for the transmission and execution of file system operations by 
exchanging messages using TCP/IP. It has a set list of commands for inter-node 
communication. 
6.5.4 FAULT TOLERANCE 
A file system that allows for data to become corrupt is useless for the accurate storage 
of information. To maintain fault tolerance NetRAID implements hashing to maintain high 
level data integrity. TCP/IP also has its own set of data integrity tools that NetRAID takes 
advantages of. NetRAID meets both of Svobodova' s [ 41] requirements that data be 
recoverable and robust. The file is recoverable since it can revert back to the saved state. 
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The user can grab the backed up file from the cluster. The file is robust since it can survive a 
storage medium crash. The goal of implementing the RAID-like system is to make sure if 
one virtual disk was destroyed, it could be regenerated from the other virtual disks. 
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7 NETRAID'S FUTURE 
Future NetRAID versions should be able to implement sharing of files between 
clients and node, scalability beyond storage nodes for larger networks, and server based 
queuing for dealing with modems and other non reliable connections. NetRAID should also 
be able to support network load balancing and proxies. 
7.1 NODE UPGRADES 
The node could be made a lot smaller by implementing some sort of built in ZIP or 
dynamic allocation. This could lead to more fragmentation and could actually slow the 
system down. 
A possible future extension to NetRAID is to allow sharing between users of files 
held in nrdfs. To implement this functionality, the server will need to be able to analyze 
what might be the best place store a file based on who in the cluster can see it. 
7.2 BEYOND THE PEER-TO-PEER STRUCTURE 
NetRAID does not necessary need to be a peer-to-peer application for which 
everyone provides storage. The original concept of NetRAID decoupled the virtual file 
system from the members. If a large group of people wanted to set up a cluster and some of 
them had very little room on their machines, while others had large RAIDs or expensive and 
reliable storage or high bandwidth, it would make more sense for everyone to store data on 
the more powerful machines. But to do this it would be necessary to have a client that would 
allow the users to manipulate their own data on the storage nodes. This would be ideal for 
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low bandwidth and less reliable client connections. All participants must understand and 
agree to an arrangement by which they are sharing bandwidth resources unequally. 
7.3 IMPROVEMENTS TO THE FILE UPDATE SYSTEM 
Initially NetRAID can only perform file updates by using brute force to send a new 
copy of the file. This could be better accomplished with an rsync [36] type of transmission 
method by which only information that has changed is sent. Rsync [ 4 7] could cause less data 
to be transmitted, but would introduce another protocol and new potential security flaws into 
the NetRAID framework. 
The first version of NetRAID has not included rsync due to the extra complexity. 
Burns and Long [9] published some research in delta compression in distributed systems that 
could also be applicable. They also examined only transmitting the changes in the file. This 
could be implemented by sending something similar to a patch file through the network 
instead of comparing data blocks. 
For now, the user will need to manually delete the old file and add the new one. 
Since NetRAID uses file numbers not file names for identification, there is no problem with 
having more than one file with the same name in the system. 
7.4 IMPROVEMENTS TO THE FILE RETRIEVE SYSTEM 
NetRAID could be easily extended to use a system similar to Bittorrent [10] to allow 
several nodes to transmit information at the same time to speed up the transfer process. On 
most systems there is more download bandwidth than upload, so several computers can send 
to the same machine to optimize the data flow. 
48 
7.5 OTHER RAID LEVELS 
At the current time NetRAID is capable of a data structure similar to RAID 3 or 5. 
NetRAID should also be able to emulate disk mirroring. This would allow for two people to 
set up a cluster and have duplicate information. A client node could even be configured to 
support having two mirrored virtual drives for even more reliability. Each drive could be on 
a different disk or computer. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
The NetRAID framework has the potential.to bring easy, inexpensive, and distributed 
back-up to the average computer user. Encryption helps make transmission and storage 
secure, and redundancy allows NetRAID to survive the lost of storage or server nodes 
without losing information. NetRAID has modular characteristics that allow for flexibility in 
encryption and transmission protocols, and to allow rapid updates as new flaws or 
enhancements to different dependencies are released. The framework is intended to be 
flexible to meet new user needs as they arise. As the capacities of the internet and CPUs 
increase, NetRAID's fi.ngerprint will decrease and its usefulness will increase. 
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APPENDIX 
Al GLOSSARY OF TERMS: 
Cluster: A set ofNetRAID nodes acting as the virtual RAID 
Node: A NetRAID client. It has both server and client functions. This is the equivalent to a 
s ingle disk that is part of a RAID. 
A2 EMA IL FROM HEWLETT PAC KARO 
Dear Chris, 
Thank you for contacting HP. After some review, we found that we are no 
longer using this mark and that there is no problem with you using this term. 
Regards, 
IPL 
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